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On October 19, 2005, in a former presidential palace that had been hastily refurbished to resemble a respectable courtroom, Saddam Hussein went on trial.
The case brought against Hussein and his seven co-defendants 
was based on events in the town of al-Dujayl in 1982, where 
Hussein’s regime countered an assassination attempt on its 
leader with the execution of 148 people. But these will not 
be the last charges filed against top figures in the old regime. 
The Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal has jurisdiction to try 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes 
committed during the period of Ba‘thist rule between 1968 and 
2003, which include the chemical attack on the Kurdish village 
of Halabja in 1988, the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the 
repression of the Shi‘i uprising in southern Iraq in 1991. It is 
still unclear how many of the crimes of which the old regime is 
accused will actually be prosecuted. On April 4, 2006, however, 
the prosecution team announced that charges related to the 
Anfal genocide against the Kurds in 1987–1988, a campaign 
that included the Halabja attack, will be brought after the 
al-Dujayl verdict, which is expected in August.
The progress of the trial so far has left a pertinent question 
unanswered. Why is Hussein not standing trial for biological 
and chemical weapons attacks on Iranian soldiers and civil-
ians during the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq war? That these gross 
violations of international norms will probably not be taken 
up by the tribunal reveals the international and domestic 
politics involved in the trial. To be more precise: Saddam 
Hussein’s war crimes can only be fully addressed if the court 
uncovers the collusion of Western firms and governments 
with Hussein’s illicit weapons programs during the 1980s. Let 
us hope, given that intrusive political context, that at the end 
of the trial we are not shocked by what we partly suspect: 
that an opportunity for regional reconciliation in the wider 
Persian Gulf area has been lost, that the trial has reproduced 
Iraq as a place of imperial competition, and that history has 
denied the Iraqi people the opportunity to engage the past 
to lend speech to those voices which would constitute the 
new, post-Ba‘thist civil society. Let us hope, in short, that the 
trial does not create yet another discontinuity in the history 
of the country.
saddam’s american alchemists
Although the Scud missile attacks on Israel in 1991 were also 
serious breaches of the laws of war, Saddam Hussein’s violations 
of established international norms were more profound during 
the Iran-Iraq war.1 There is now conclusive evidence for both the 
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degree of Saddam Hussein’s non-conventional warfare against 
Iran and the international support provided to this end.2
In a speech to the House of representatives on July 27, 1992, 
rep. Henry Gonzalez (D-TX) outlined how “between 1983 
and the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Iraq received $5 billion in 
[Department of Agriculture Commodity Credit Corporation] 
guarantees that allowed them to purchase united States 
agricultural products on credit.”3 In October of the same 
year, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and urban 
Affairs held hearings, whose findings were later confirmed by 
a committee report, revealing that the uS had exported not 
only agricultural products, but also “chemical, biological, 
nuclear and missile-system equipment to Iraq that was 
converted to military use in Iraq’s chemical, biological and 
nuclear weapons program.”4 Chemical weapons were in turn 
used against uS soldiers in the 1991 war.5 On May 25, 1994, 
another investigation showed that the uS government 
approved sales of a wide range of chemical and biological 
materials to Iraq, including components of mustard gas, 
anthrax, clostridium botulinum, histoplasma capsulatum, 
brucella melitensis and clostridium perfringens.6
In December 2002, Andreas Zumach, an investigative 
journalist working for the German Tageszeitung, gathered 
and published classified information excerpted from a report 
presented to the united Nations by the Ba‘thist regime in 
hopes of averting the ensuing invasion of Iraq in 2003.7 
According to the report, which was not circulated beyond the 
five permanent members of the Security Council, 14 American 
corporations, including Hewlett-Packard, unisys and Dupont, 
were directly involved in the buildup of Iraq’s biological, 
chemical and atomic industries.8 Historically valuable if seen 
in comparison with current uS accusations about Iran’s nuclear 
research program, the report also listed the Departments of 
Defense, Energy, Commerce and Agriculture, and the nuclear 
research facilities Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos and Sandia, 
as suppliers for Saddam Hussein’s conventional and/or non-
conventional weapons programs.
saddam’s european alchemists
German and British companies are also implicated. The 
German involvement in Iraq’s chemical weapons industry 
was initially concentrated on the chemical plant in Samarra’, 
built by Iraq’s State Establishment for Pesticides Production. 
The companies involved in this project were Preussag Heriger, 
Hammer, rhein-Bayern, Karl Kolb/Pilot Plant and Water 
Engineering Trading, a company based in Hamburg. The 
German weekly magazine Stern reported on December 10, 1987 
that Kolb/Pilot Plant exported to Baghdad a “gas chamber” 
suitable for testing chemical weapons on dogs and cats. The 
same company was involved in the second-largest chemical 
weapons plant in Falluja.
In 1990, a report submitted to the German parliament 
by the late German Minister of Trade, Jürgen Möllemann, 
provided further insight into the involvement of Kolb/Pilot 
Plant in Iraq’s chemical weapons industry. On page 22 it is 
stated that the German government believed as early as 1982 
that German companies were involved in Saddam Hussein’s 
chemical warfare industry and that these allegations were veri-
fied in 1984. The German government subsequently pursued 
“informal” talks with the companies concerned, which did 
not yield any results.9 In fact, Kolb/Pilot Plant constructed a 
new chemical plant in Falluja in 1988, a site which featured in 
former Secretary of State Colin Powell’s case for the invasion of 
Iraq presented to the uN Security Council in February 2003. 
It also featured in a September 2002 report by Britain’s Joint 
Intelligence Committee, to the great benefit of Prime Minister 
Tony Blair when he sought to justify the invasion.
In March 2003, the Guardian revealed that the British 
company uhde was also involved in the Falluja chemical plant, 
which was central to Iraq’s chemical warfare arsenal during a 
period when “senior officials recorded in writing that Saddam 
Hussein was actively gassing his opponents.” uhde received the 
contract to supply a chlorine plant in December 1984, agreeing 
to pay its German intermediary a commission of almost one 
million pounds. uhde, which is based in Hounslow, west of 
London, had only a handful of employees, and was run by 
German executives. It was wholly owned by a German firm 
of the same name, headquartered in Dortmund. This sister 
company, in turn, was at the time a subsidiary of the German 
chemical giant Hoechst.10
The documents made available to the Guardian also showed 
that then Trade Minister Paul Channon rejected a strong plea 
from the foreign minister, richard Luce, who argued that the 
deal would ruin Britain’s image in the world. “I consider it 
essential everything possible be done to oppose the proposed 
sale,” Luce pleaded, “and to deny the company concerned 
[Export Credit Guarantee Department] cover.” “A ban,” 
Channon replied, in line with the Thatcher government’s 
support for Saddam Hussein against Iran, “would do our other 
trade prospects in Iraq no good.”11
the alchemy of War Crimes
Complaints from the Iranian side about Iraq’s chemical warfare 
can be traced back to November 1980. Yet it took the inter-
national community, including the most prominent NGOs, 
at least three and a half years to investigate the allegations 
systematically. A report by the Stockholm International Peace 
and research Institute dated May 1984 testifies that:
Three and a quarter years [after the first Iranian complaints in 
November 1980], by which time the outside world was listening 
more seriously to such charges, the Iranian foreign minister told the 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva that there had been at least 
49 instances of Iraqi chemical warfare attack in 40 border regions, 
and that the documented dead totaled 109 people, with hundreds 
more wounded.
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The same report indicated that, after visiting several hospitals 
in Tehran, the International Committee of the red Cross 
confirmed that “substances prohibited by international law” 
were employed during hostilities. uN confirmation came later 
in May 1984, in the form of a report from the secretary-general 
condemning the use of chemical weapons, without, however, 
naming Iraq as the perpetrating party.12
Moreover, a State Department memo to then Secretary 
of State George Shultz in November 1983 confirms that 
the uS knew “that Iraq has acquired a CW production 
capability, primarily from Western firms, including possibly 
a uS foreign subsidiary” and that it appeared that Iraq used 
chemical weapons almost on a daily basis.13 Further intel-
ligence suggested that “as long ago as July 1982, Iraq used tear 
gas and skin irritants against invading Iranian forces quite 
effectively” and that “in October 1982, unspecified foreign 
officers fired lethal chemical weapons at the orders of Saddam 
during battles in the Mandali area.”14 In an affidavit to a uS 
District Court in Florida, National Security Council staff 
member Howard Teicher revealed that the uS collusion with 
Iraq was indeed strategic, going beyond mere economic and 
diplomatic assistance:
Pursuant to the secret National Security Decision Directive,15 the 
united States actively supported the Iraqi war effort by supplying 
the Iraqis with billions of dollars of credits, by providing uS military 
intelligence and advice to the Iraqis, and by clearly monitoring third-
country arms sales to Iraq to make sure that Iraq had the military 
weaponry required. The united States also provided strategic opera-
tional advice to the Iraqis to better use their forces in combat. For 
example, in 1986, President reagan sent a secret message to Saddam 
Hussein telling him that Iraq should step up its air war and bomb-
ing of Iran. This message was delivered by vice President Bush, who 
communicated it to Egyptian President Mubarak, who in turn passed 
the message to Saddam Hussein. Similar strategic operational military 
advice was passed to Saddam Hussein through various meetings with 
European and Middle Eastern heads of state where the strategic 
operational advice was communicated.16
Iraq’s employment of poison gas found comparable cover at 
the united Nations. Hence, when the Iranian government 
submitted a draft resolution asking for uN condemnation of 
the chemical warfare by Iraq, the uS delegate was instructed to 
lobby for a general motion of “no decision” on the resolution. 
At a meeting between the Iraqi interest section head, Nizar 
Hamdoun, and then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James 
Placke on March 29, 1984, the former spelled out what the 
Iraqi government expected from the uN resolution. Hamdoun 
stressed that his country preferred a Security Council presi-
dential statement to a resolution, and that such a statement 
Iranian victims of Iraqi gas attacks gather near the German Embassy in Tehran to denounce German supply of chemicals to the Iraqi regime.  rAHEB HOMAvANDI/rEuTErS/LANDOv
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should make reference to former resolutions on the war and 
progress toward termination of the conflict, while making 
no allocation of responsibility regarding the employment of 
chemical weapons. One day after the meeting, the Security 
Council issued the aforementioned presidential statement, 
condemning the use of chemical weapons without naming 
Iraq as the offending party. A State Department memorandum 
from March 30, 1984 acknowledged the successful diplomatic 
spin in support of Iraq, noting that the “statement…contains 
all three elements Hamdoun wanted.”17
From Saddam Hussein’s perspective, the cover provided 
by the reagan administration was reason enough to presume 
that deployment of chemical weapons would not seriously 
damage Iraq’s international reputation—particularly consid-
ering that China, France, Japan and other countries, according 
to the Tageszeitung investigation, were also supplying Iraqi 
non-conventional weapons manufacturers. Hussein’s degree 
of carelessness was in many ways indicative of his degree of 
comfort. In this spirit, the Ba‘thist government, expecting a 
major offensive by Iranian forces, had issued a public statement 
that “the invaders should know that for every harmful insect 
there is an insecticide capable of annihilating it whatever its 
numbers and that Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide.”18 
Asked in March 1984 whether or not Iraqi use of chemical 
weapons would affect uS-Iraqi diplomatic and economic 
relations, a State Department press briefer replied: “No. I am 
not aware of any change in our position. We’re interested in 
being involved in a closer dialogue with Iraq.”19
uS awareness of Iraq’s chemical warfare is also confirmed 
by a former Defense Intelligence Agency officer, Lt. Col. 
rick Francona, who served in the uS Embassy in Baghdad in 
1987 and 1988. According to Francona, the uS “believed the 
Iraqis were using mustard gas all through the war, but that 
was not as sinister as nerve gas…. They started using tabun 
[a nerve gas] as early as 1983 or 1984, but in a very limited 
way. They were probably figuring out how to use it. And in 
1988, they developed sarin.” Francona also revealed that the 
reagan administration provided “planning assistance” for the 
successful Iraqi offensive on the Faw peninsula in 1988. “When 
I was walking around,” Francona told the Guardian, “I saw 
atropine injectors lying around. We saw decontamination fluid 
on vehicles,” he elaborated, “[but] there were no insects. There 
was a very quick response from Washington saying, ‘Let’s stop 
our cooperation,’ but it didn’t last long—just weeks.”20
International collusion with Iraq’s war efforts confirmed the 
impression of the Ba‘thist regime that they had been granted a 
free rider role, creating the paradox that by using “Iraq to wear 
Iran down,” as raymond Hinnebusch puts it, the cooperative 
norms and institutions of international society itself were 
rendered useless, manipulated to function according to the 
overarching leitmotif of preventing Iranian advances.21 In turn, 
this compromised the authority of the international commu-
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nity to act as a restraining force during the war and thereafter. 
Intercepted communications from Saddam Hussein’s cousin 
‘Ali Hasan al-Majid, called “Chemical Ali” for his command 
role in the Anfal campaign, indicates the level of disregard and 
arrogance that Ba‘thist officials had developed for international 
norms by the end of the Iran-Iraq war:
Jalal Talabani [leader of the Patriotic union of Kurdistan, regarded 
then as “agents of Iran” by Baghdad] asked me to open a special chan-
nel of communication with him. That evening I went to Suleimaniya 
and hit them with the special ammunition. That was my answer. We 
continued the deportations [of the Kurds]. I told the mustashars22 that 
they might say that they like their villages and that they won’t leave. I 
said, I cannot let your village stay because I will attack it with chemical 
weapons. Then you and your family will die. You must leave right now. 
Because I cannot tell you the same day that I am going to attack with 
chemical weapons. I will kill them all with chemical weapons. Who 
is going to say anything? The international community? Fuck them! 
The international community and those who listen to them.23
It was against that background that Saddam Hussein could 
organize and implement the genocidal Anfal campaign against 
Iraq’s Kurdish population and Iranian army units operating 
in the area, culminating in the gassing of the northern Iraqi 
town of Halabja, which killed at least 4,000 people in March 
1988. Not only had the international community failed to 
intervene previously, it provided the Iraqi regime with the 
means for pursuing its policies: from the ingredients for the 
chlorine based mustard gas employed in the Halabja attacks 
to the diplomatic coverup outlined above.24
a Few antidotes
Let me depart from the empirical facts now in order to close 
with a review of the wider implications of the aforementioned 
for international anarchy in West Asia. That Saddam Hussein’s 
war crimes during the Iran-Iraq war have not been comprehen-
sively covered—legally, intellectually and normatively—indi-
cates that the trial against him does not occur in a vacuum.
International law is embedded in “international political 
culture,” a ferociously contested space where ideas, norms 
and institutions compete and where legitimacy is socially 
engineered rather than legally constituted.25 International 
behavior during the war reveals in what way this international 
culture made manifest the existence of unrestrained anarchy 
and how the Iran-Iraq war owed its ferocity to the non-exis-
tence of a restraining order, regional or global. Here lies the 
importance of indicting Saddam Hussein for the whole range 
of war crimes that he committed: it would trigger a process the 
aim of which is to rediscover on what basis Halabja became 
possible; within what international context chemical warfare 
was legitimated; on the basis of what historical narrative and 
in the service of what power, Saddam Hussein could appear 
as somebody with whom “it would be possible to do busi-
ness”26 for several decades only to be branded the new Adolf 
Hitler after his invasion of Kuwait. Such a process, moreover, 
would bring to light the international context in which 
Halabjas, Abu Ghraibs, Sabra and Shatilas, and Jenins can 
happen. It would reveal how states ground their militaristic 
policies and thereby have fostered an international order that 
is not moving toward perfection, but rather toward recurrent 
crisis, especially in the Muslim worlds. In holding states 
responsible, in short, what should appear are those political 
configurations that have given rise to anarchy in West Asia. 
Such an enterprise perhaps is not so much a legal effort, but 
an intellectual endeavor aimed at finding empathetic antidotes 
for the existing calamities of international life.                      ■
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